37082, Washington, DC 20402–9328. Copies are also available from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161–0002. A copy is also available for inspection and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555–0001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Philip G. Brochman, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415–8592, e-mail PGB@nrc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NRC is announcing the availability of NUREG/ CR-5342, "Assessment and Recommendations for Fissile Material Packaging Exemptions and General Licenses Within 10 CFR Part 71." This final report contains an assessment of the technical and regulatory bases for the NRC's regulations in Part 71 related to the transport of fissile material under general license or fissile exemption limits and provides recommendations on potential changes to the regulations.

### I. Background

In September 1996, an NRC licensee identified that the fissile material exemption standards in §71.53 do not provide adequate criticality safety for certain shipments of fissile material 1 (i.e., highly-enriched uranium in the presence of beryllium oxide). The NRC licensee determined through calculation, that a planned shipment, which contained large amounts of lowconcentration, highly-enriched uranium'which met the fissile exemption material limits in § 71.53(d)—and which was also mixed with a large amount of beryllium, could result in a nuclear criticality 2 under certain conditions. As a consequence, the Commission issued an emergency final rule to revise the fissile material exemption limits in Part 71 (62 FR 5907; February 10, 1997). The Commission also requested that the public submit comments on the final rule, during a 30-day period following the rule's publication.

In developing the emergency final rule, the NRC staff noted that the regulatory and technical bases for the fissile material exemption limits and general license provisions of Part 71 were not internally consistent nor well documented. Additionally, all seven of the commenters on the final rule objected to parts of the rule as being unduly burdensome and overly restrictive. The NRC determined that further evaluation into the regulatory and technical bases for these regulations was necessary.

Subsequently, the NRC contracted with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to: (1) perform an independent evaluation of the regulations related to the transport of fissile material under the fissile material exemption and general license limits of Part 71; (2) review the technical issues raised by public comments on the emergency final rule; (3) perform independent calculations of the minimum critical mass limits for different combinations of fissile material and moderating material; and (4) identify potential changes to the fissile material exemption and general license limits of Part 71 which may be warranted.

The results of ORNL's study are contained in NUREG/CR-5342 and are available for public review. The NRC is currently reviewing the recommendations contained in this report.

### **II. Electronic Access**

NUREG/CR-5342 is also available electronically in the Reference Library area of the NRC's Home Page under Technical Reports (http://www.nrc.gov).

# **Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act**

In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of 1996, NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has verified this determination with Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of July 1998.

For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

## Susan F. Shankman,

Deputy Director, Licensing and Inspection Directorate, Spent Fuel Project Office, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. [FR Doc. 98–22331 Filed 8–18–98; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

# OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

[3206-0082]

Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request; Review of a Revised Information Collection; Presidential Management Intern Program Application

**AGENCY:** Office of Personnel Management. **ACTION:** Notice.

**SUMMARY:** In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-13, May 22, 1995), this notice announces that the Office of Personnel Management has submitted to the Office of Management and Budget a request for clearance of a revised information collection. The Office of Personnel Management is requesting OMB to authorize procession of collection of information associated with the Presidential Management Intern Program Application. Processing and approval of the 1998 Presidential Management Intern Program Application is necessary to facilitate the timely nomination, selection and placement of Presidential Management Intern Finalists in Federal agencies.

We estimate 2000 applications will be received and processed in 1998. Each application takes approximately 2 hours to complete (one hour for applicants (nominees) and one hour for nominating school officials). The annual estimated burden is 4000 hours.

For copies of this proposal, contact Mary Beth Smith-Toomey at (202) 606–8358, or e-mail to mbtoomey@opm.gov. DATES: Comments on this proposal should be received on or before August 26, 1998.

#### ADDRESSES:

Kathleen A. Keeney, Presidential Management Intern Program, U.S. Office of Personnel Management, William J. Green, Jr., Federal Building, 600 Arch Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106. and

Joseph Lackey, OPM Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, New Executive Office Building, NW, Room 10235 Washington, DC 20503.

FOR INFORMATION REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION—CONTACT: Kathleen A. Keeney (215) 597–1920.

Office of Personnel Management.

Janice R. Lachance,

Director.

[FR Doc. 98-22397 Filed 8-17-98; 1:14 pm] BILLING CODE 6325-01-P

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Fissile material is defined in Part 71 as: plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-241, uranium-233, uranium-235, or any combination of these radionuclides. Transportation packages used for shipment of materials containing these radionuclides must meet specific standards and operating limits designed to preclude nuclear criticality during transport, unless excepted by specific regulations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>For transportation purposes, nuclear criticality means a condition in which an uncontrolled, self-sustaining, and neutron-multiplying fission chain reaction occurs. Nuclear criticality is generally a concern when sufficient concentrations and masses of fissile material and neutron moderating material exist together in a favorable configuration. Neutron moderating material cannot achieve criticality by itself in any concentration or configuration. However, It can enhance the ability of fissile material to achieve criticality by slowing down neutrons or reflecting neutrons.